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Zambias u m m a r y
Zambia removed user fees in publicly supported–government and faith-based–health facilities in 54 out
of 72 districts in 2006. This was extended to rural areas of previously unaffected districts in 2007. The
natural experiment provided by the step-wise implementation of the removal policy and five waves of
nationally representative household survey data enables us to study the impact of the removal policy
on utilization and household health expenditure. We find that the policy increased overall use of health
services in the short term and the effects were sustained in the long term. The increases were higher for
individuals whose household heads were unemployed or had no or less education. The policy also led to a
small shift in care seeking from private to publicly supported facilities, an effect driven primarily by indi-
viduals whose household heads were either formally employed or engaged in farming. The likelihood of
incurring any spending reduced, although this weakened slightly in the long term. At the same time,
there was an upward pressure on conditional health expenditure, i.e., expenditure was higher after
removal of fees for those who incurred any spending. Hence, total (unconditional) household health
expenditure was not significantly affected.
 2017 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Health care was freely provided in many low- and middle-
income countries (LMIC) before the mid 1980s. However, an
increasing number of countries started introducing charges at the
point of use, known as user fees (Akin, Birdsall, & De Ferranti,
1987; Yates, 2009), a wave of enthusiasm generated by an influen-
tial World Bank report (Akin et al., 1987). Importantly, LMIC were
facing severe health care financing challenges that affected the
quality of health services. The two main arguments for user fees
were that they would provide extra resources to the health system
and act as a rationing devise, preventing the frivolous use of health
services. In practice, although user fee revenues accounted for 5–
12% of total health system revenue at the central level, they
accounted for 50–100% of non-salary operating costs at the facility
level in most countries (Gilson, 1997). In Zambia, they constituted
27.6–80.7% of facility non-salary operating costs (Cheelo et al.,
2010). These resources were used to supplement salaries, finance
community activities such as outreach, hire additional staff, and
purchase supplies (Carasso, Lagarde, Cheelo, Chansa, & Palmer,
2012).Apart from the health financing role, there has been debate on
the demand effects of user fees, polarized by two sets of findings.
The first set examines the short-term effect of introducing user fees
(Asfaw, von Braun, & Klasen, 2004; Blas & Limbambala, 2001;
Mwabu, Mwanzia, & Liambila, 1995) or removing them (Masiye,
Chitah, & McIntyre, 2010; Xu et al., 2006) and finds that user fees
deter access to care. But whether these changes in demand are
due to frivolous use remains an open question. The second set of
findings however shows that user fees do not necessarily reduce,
but increase, the utilization of health care when accompanied by
quality improvements (Akashi, Yamada, Huot, Kanal, & Sugimoto,
2004; Barber, Bonnet, & Bekedam, 2004; Litvack & Bodart, 1993;
Mataria, Luchini, Daoud, & Moatti, 2007; Soucat et al., 1997), which
are made possible by the extra resources from user fees. Both sets
of findings can be justified from a theoretical standpoint; the over-
all demand effect of changing the price of care, through user fees,
depends on the responsiveness of demand to changes in price on
one hand, and changes in quality on the other hand, and these pull
in different directions.
However, no study has shown reductions in utilization when
fees are removed to complement studies that find increases ing-Term
2 P. Hangoma et al. /World Development xxx (2017) xxx–xxxutilization when fees are introduced. This is despite indications
that removal of user fees was accompanied by reduction in quality
measures, e.g., drug availability, health worker motivation, etc., in
most countries (Masiye et al., 2010; Meessen et al., 2011). A possi-
ble explanation is that although these quality measures reduced,
they did not reduce enough to dilute the positive demand effects
of user fee removal, chiefly because some commitments were
made to compensate health facility revenue loss. However, these
commitments were either delayed, not met, or if met, they were
not sustained (Meessen et al., 2011), underscoring the importance
of studying long-term policy effects. An alternative explanation is
that individuals in these contexts, at least in the short-term, are
more sensitive to price reductions than they are to reductions in
quality. In markets where price is more important than quality,
health services are generally of poor quality (Das, Hammer, &
Leonard, 2008).
There are calls to move away from user fees toward health care
financing systems based on pooling, such as social health
insurance- or tax-based systems (World Health Organization,
2010), so as to achieve universal health coverage (UHC).1 Yet others
contend that LMIC have limited capacity to implement such systems
because of a high informal sector share which makes it hard to col-
lect tax or insurance contributions (Bitran, 2014; Wagstaff, 2010).
Although policies exempting the poor from user fees have been his-
torically unsuccessful, the Cambodian experience shows that a suc-
cessful user fee policy can be implemented alongside a well-
targeted equity fund (Bigdeli & Ir, 2010; Meessen, Damme,
Tashobya, & Tibouti, 2007). The challenge again is that governance
structures are weak in most LMIC (Leonard, Bloom, Hanson,
O’Farrell, & Spicer, 2013) and for equity reasons, the solution boils
down to removing user fees for all. However, there is doubt on
whether removing user fees would enable the provision of care that
improves health, even when demand rises, if no compensating sup-
ply side measures are taken to maintain or improve quality
(Campbell, Oulton, McPake, & Buchan, 2011). Evidence shows that
following user fee removals, individuals visiting public facilities
had to rely on the private market for things such as drugs (Hadley,
2011; Nabyonga Orem, Mugisha, Kirunga, Macq, & Criel, 2011).
Under such supply side constraints, financial risk may remain
high even with user fee removal. Additionally, a market for infor-
mal payments may be created. These payments could make up
for the loss in incentives provided by user fees (Meessen et al.,
2007), worsening financial risk (Barber et al., 2004). At the same
time, individuals with higher ability to pay, wanting to get, now
relatively scarce resources — e.g., drugs—would be willing to pay
bribes or under the table payments. The widespread incidence of
informal payments in low-income countries is well documented
(Barber et al., 2004; Falkingham, 2004; Lindkvist, 2013). In Zambia,
there is anecdotal evidence of the existence of informal payments
(Hadley, 2011). Hence, whether the removal of user fees reduces
medical spending is an empirical issue.
This study seeks to contribute to the literature examining the
demand consequences of free health care, specifically, removal of
user fees. Although the existing literature is rich and informative,
it is plagued with a number of limitations (Dzakpasu, Powell-
Jackson, & Campbell, 2014; Lagarde & Palmer, 2008). First, the
widespread use of facility/administrative data possess severe lim-
itations bordering on poor quality of this type of data in LMIC
(Ashraf, Fink, & Weil, 2014; Lim, Stein, Charrow, & Murray, 2008;
Sandefur & Glassman, 2015), and lack of detailed socioeconomic
variables for examining heterogeneities (Masiye et al., 2010). Sec-
ond most of the studies do not have access to policy changes that1 UHC requires providing access to quality health care for all who need it, and
ensuring that they are not impoverished as a result of accessing care.
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rent events, see for example Asfaw et al. (2004), Mwabu et al.
(1995) and Xu et al. (2006). Some studies which have access to rea-
sonable quasi-experiments face the challenge of having a few sam-
ple points—health facilities—threatening reliability as well as
generalizability of findings. Although some studies have enlight-
ened us on the effect of user fees in experimental situations
(Cohen & Dupas, 2010; Kremer & Miguel, 2007; Powell-Jackson,
Hanson, Whitty, & Ansah, 2014; Thornton, 2008), their validity
may be limited when one has to imagine large and complex
national scale interventions with system wide implications
(Acemoglu, 2010). The dearth of evidence on the impact of com-
plex user fee policies implemented at national scale motivated
Ridde and Haddad (2009) to conclude that ‘‘African public health
officials and decision makers are worried about the relationship
between abolishing user fees and health care financing, and much
remains to be done to provide them with the evidence they
require.”
By combining several waves of huge nationally representative
household survey data in Zambia for the period 1998–10 and the
natural experiment provided by the step-wise implementation of
the removal policy, we overcome some of the methodological
and data challenges of the existing literature. Our identification
strategy exploits the fact that in April 2006, the government of
Zambia removed user fees in all publicly supported health facili-
ties—government and faith-based (mission) facilities—at the pri-
mary level in 54 out of 72 districts classified as rural (MoH,
2007). Specifically, the removal policy stipulated that ‘‘All services
for which clients were paying user/medical fees i.e consultation,
treatment, admission, and diagnostic services shall be free”
(MoH, 2007). The removal policy was extended to rural areas of
the remaining 18 previously unaffected districts in June 2007.
Thus, only urban areas of the 18 districts remained unaffected by
both waves of the removal policy. We use difference-in-
difference (DD) models and carry out a number of robustness
checks to assess the validity of our identifying assumption.
This study contributes to the debate on free health care in gen-
eral, and removal of user fees in particular, in at least four ways.
First, our data enable us to examine the effect of the removal policy
on overall use of health care. Previous studies in Zambia have only
examined the effect of the first wave of removals on utilization of
publicly supported health facilities (Lagarde, Barroy, & Palmer,
2012; Masiye et al., 2010; Onde, 2009), but have not been able to
determine whether this could have been due to an increase in
overall use of health care (uptake effect) or shift in care seeking
from private facilities (switching effect), or indeed both. Switching
may not improve health if quality of care in publicly supported and
private facilities is the same, which appears to be the case (Basu,
Andrews, Kishore, Panjabi, & Stuckler, 2012; Das et al., 2008;
Powell-Jackson, Macleod, Benova, Lynch, & Campbell, 2015).2 How-
ever, even if quality of care is the same but perverse incentives in
private facilities unnecessarily increase the cost of care, then switch-
ing may improve social welfare by eliminating inefficiencies.
Second, access to rich household survey data permits us to
examine heterogeneous effects of the removal policy by socioeco-
nomic status. This is important in assessing whether removal of
user fees elicited a higher utilization response from individuals
from lower socioeconomic backgrounds as the policy intended.
Third, we provide evidence on the extent to which the removal
policy affected household medical spending, an important starting
point in discussing financial risk protection. Most of the studies
have focused on utilization effects. This is an important gap2 Here we refer to formal private-for-profit health facilities which constitute about
14% of health facilities in Zambia and are regulated by the Health Professions Council
(HPC) (MoH, 2011).
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cally translate into reduced financial risk protection. Descriptive
evidence in Uganda, for example found no evidence of reduced
household medical spending following removal of user fees
(Nabyonga Orem et al., 2011; Xu et al., 2006). Even after the nation-
wide removal of user fees in Zambia, 10% of the population experi-
enced catastrophic spending in 2013 (Masiye, Kaonga, & Kirigia,
2016). More credible evidence in the health insurance literature
suggests that some form of free care, or subsidized care, while
increasing utilization, may not reduce health spending (Ataguba
& Goudge, 2012; Fink, Robyn, Sié, & Sauerborn, 2013; Liu & Zhao,
2014; Nguyen, 2012; Wagstaff, Lindelow, Jun, Ling, & Juncheng,
2009) and may actually increase financial risk (Wagstaff &
Lindelow, 2008).
Fourth, we study the long-term effect of the removal policy.
This shades light on the ability of the removal policy to sustain
gains in utilization and medical spending since the demand effects
of the removal policy may vary over time as quality of care
changes. A few available studies find that gains in utilization are
not sustained (Lagarde et al., 2012), while others find that they
are (Nabyonga Orem, Mapunda, Musango, & Mugisha, 2013), but
these studies are at best descriptive. Our study is the first to pro-
vide carefully isolated evidence of the long-term effects of a user
fee policy implemented at national scale.
Result show that overall use of health services (uptake)
increased, although there was a small shift in care seeking from
private to publicly supported facilities (switching). The increase
in overall use of health services was driven primarily by individu-
als from lower socioeconomic backgrounds. The proportion of indi-
viduals incurring any spending fell but there was an upward
pressure on the amount of spending for those individuals still
incurring any spending (conditional spending). As a results, total
(unconditional) health spending was not significantly affected.
The effects on utilization and medical spending observed in the
short-term were maintained in the long-term.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides
a short overview of the setting of this study and the user fee
removal policy. Section 3 discusses data and identification. The
empirical specification is given in Section 4, results in Section 5.
We discuss our findings in Section 6 and conclude in Section 7.3 An informative, though crude, check on the level of informality is to observe that
the proportion of individuals who report using private facility in nationwide
household surveys is far lower, e.g., 6% in 2010 (CSO, 2012), than the proportion of
formal private health facilities, 14%, captured by HPC. If the proportion of people
reporting using private facilities was close, equal, or more than the proportion of
formally register private facilities, then there would be a high possibility of high
informality. That said, the level of informality varies widely across countries even
within the same region (Sheikh, Josyula, Zhang, Bigdeli, & Ahmed, 2017). This makes it
hard to make judgments based on other regions, especially that the private-for-profit
sector is far smaller in Zambia compared to other LMICs. More information about HPC
and health facilities in Zambia can be accessed at http://hpcz.org.zm/hpcz-publica-
tions/.2. Context and user fee removal
In 2015, Zambia’s population was estimated at 15.5 million
(CSO, 2016).With an urban share of 42%, it is one of themost urban-
ized countries in Africa. Zambia is classified as a lower middle-
income country with GNP per capita of USD 1,810 (World Bank,
2015), but remains one of the most unequal countries in terms of
income and social services (UNDP, 2014). In 2010, poverty levels
were estimated at 60.5% with more than 83% of the labor force
employed in the informal sector (CSO, 2012). The size and extent
of informal economic activities possess a challenge to attempts by
the government to expand the tax base. The disease burden is also
high with malaria, tuberculosis, and HIV exerting a severe strain on
the health system. The burden of non-communicable diseases is
also on the increase (Institute for Health Metrics & Evaluation,
Human Development Network, The World Bank, 2013).
Zambia is administratively divided into 10 provinces (increased
from 9 in 2010), which are further divided into districts. The num-
ber of districts increased from 64 in 2010 to the current 106. Deliv-
ery of health care follows a 3-tier system, namely, primary,
secondary, and tertiary level, and the referral system follows these
levels. The primary level consists of health posts, health centers,
and first-level hospitals. A few districts have first-level hospitalsPlease cite this article in press as: Hangoma, P., et al. Does Free Public Health Car
Effects. World Development (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2017.0but second-level and third-level hospitals are restricted to a few
of the 10 provinces.
In terms of ownership, 80% of health facilities are owned by
government, 6% by faith-based organizations (missions) and 14%
are private-for-profit (MoH, 2011). The Health Professions Council
(HPC) of Zambia regulates the registration and operations of all
health facilities, including private ones. Outside these formal
private-for-profit facilities, henceforth private facilities, the level
of informality is not known, but appears to be very low.3 Govern-
ment facilities have the widest coverage while private facilities are
mainly concentrated in urban areas of all provinces. Faith-based
health facilities are mostly located in rural areas and are normally
classified as private-not-for-profit. We classify them as publicly sup-
ported, together with government facilities, because government
provides funding and pays most of their health workers. In addition,
government policies such as introduction or removal of user fees
affect them equally (MoH, 2007).
Zambia has a mixed health care financing system with a heavy
reliance on external financing. Between a third to half of total
health expenditure (THE) is from external sources (Ministry of
Health, 2009; World Health Organization, 2015). Zambia spends
US$86 per capita on health and 38% of this is from households
(World Health Organization, 2015). For a long time, government
spending on health has fallen far below the Abuja target of 15%.
Health financing challenges have resulted in severe capacity con-
straints which have been driving most individuals utilizing pub-
licly supported facilities to the private market for drugs and
diagnostics. For example, a study in 2012 found that at the sec-
ondary and tertiary level, 18% of hospitals had no blood pressure
measuring equipment, 22% had no X-ray machines, and 33% had
no ultrasound machines (Institute for Health Metrics &
Evaluation, 2014). The situation is even more severe at the primary
level, the study found that about 40% of health centers, run by gov-
ernment or faith-based organizations, had no qualified staff, and
most of these were rural.
From Independence in 1964, health care in Zambia was free at
the point of use. As part of a number of structural reforms in the
early 1990s however, user fees were introduced with exemptions
for children below five years of age and adults above 65 years. User
fee charges varied across the country and were agreed upon by
health facility management and community representatives taking
into account the local economy of the health facility catchment
area.
In April 2006, a major health policy shift was announced. The
government removed user fees at the primary level in all publicly
supported health care facilities (government and private) in 54 dis-
tricts designated as rural, leaving the rest of the districts (18) that
were classified as urban unaffected. Moreover, individuals who
went through the referral system continued to be exempt at higher
levels of care. User fee removal was defined to include fees for reg-
istration, consultation, outpatient and inpatient care, X-ray, and
laboratory tests (MoH, 2007). Fig. 1 shows the districts which were
affected and unaffected by this first wave of removal of user fees.
While user fees were removed for primary services only (clinicse Increase Utilization and Reduce Spending? Heterogeneity and Long-Term
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Figure 1. Zambia. Map shows districts where user fees were removed during the
first wave of user fee removals. Three of the 18 district were each recently split into
two. Hence the number of district where user fees were maintained on this map
will count as 21 instead of 18.
4 P. Hangoma et al. /World Development xxx (2017) xxx–xxxand first-level hospitals) in publicly supported facilities, sweeping
exceptions were given for districts to offer free care even at higher
levels. For example, the policy specified that since many districts
did not have Hospital Affiliated Health Centres at first-level hospi-
tals, and many did not have these hospitals altogether, free services
were to be provided at the secondary and tertiary hospitals in
those districts (MoH, 2007).
The following year, in June 2007, the government acknowl-
edged the shortcoming of removing user fees based on classifying
the whole district as either rural or urban, and that there are areas
within urban districts that were rural and vice versa. With this
understanding, they extended the removal of user fees to rural
areas of the 18 districts that were previously unaffected.
In particular, areas where user fees were removed depended on
whether or not the district was located along the line of rail (rail-
way). For those along the line of rail, user fees where removed in
health facilities located more than 20 km away from the district
administration. Similarly, user fees were removed in health facili-
ties located more than 15 km away from the district administra-
tion for districts that were not located along the line of rail.
Implicit in the removal policy is the idea that rural areas are
located in the peripheries of the districts.
In 2012, user fees were finally removed throughout the country
in all publicly supported health facilities.4 This question existed in the 1998 survey but only referred to expenditure on self
medication.
5 Faith based are also publicly supported because, just like, government health
facilities, they rely on funding government grants. As such, they were also affected by
the removal policy. See Section 2.3. Data and identification
(a) Data sources, sample, and outcome variables
Our data are from the 1998, 2002, 2004, 2006, and 2010 Living
Conditions Monitoring Survey (LCMS). The LCMS is a large nation-
ally representative repeated cross-sectional household survey con-
ducted by the Central Statistical Office of Zambia (CSO). Although
these surveys were also conducted before 1998, it was not possible
to use these data because of changes in district boundaries making
it impossible to isolate treated from control districts.
For medical spending, we do not include the 1998 data due to
differences in components of medical spending that were collected
in 1998 compared to subsequent surveys. While the 1998 survey
asked about spending on a number of health services in the two
weeks prior to the survey, the 2002 and subsequent surveys onlyPlease cite this article in press as: Hangoma, P., et al. Does Free Public Health Car
Effects. World Development (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2017.0asked about total spending in the two weeks prior to the survey.4
It has been shown that more dissaggregation and longer list of items,
as is the case in the 1998 survey, yields higher levels of expenditures
for similar households compared to less dissaggregation (Beegle,
Weerdt, Friedman, & Gibson, 2012; Jolliffe, 2001; Pradhan, 2009).
Our analysis focuses on individuals who reported any sickness
or injury in the two weeks prior to the survey. We restrict our sam-
ple to individuals aged between 5 and 65. This is because individ-
uals under 5 years and those over 65 were exempt from user fees
even before the removal. The percentage (number) of individuals
between the age of 5 and 65 reporting sickness or injury was 9%
(7,018) in 1998, 12% (6,482) in 2002, 8% (8,182) in 2004, 7%
(6,372) in 2006, and 11% (10,003) in 2010. Individuals who
reported any sickness or injury were asked whether or not they
consulted any health facility as a result of the sickness or injury.
Those who reported consulting were then asked about the type
of facility they consulted. Using this information, we define three
measures of utilization. The first one, is an indicator variable equal
to one if an individual reported consulting a publicly supported
facility and zero if not. Individuals are said to have consulted a
publicly supported facility if they visited a government health post,
clinic, hospital, or a faith-based health facility for the illness or
injury.5 This measures total response of utilization of publicly sup-
ported facilities and it may capture both the fact that there were
more or less people using health services irrespective of provider
(uptake effect) and that there was substitution between publicly
supported and private facilities (switching effect). Thus, our second
measure of utilization is also an indicator variable equal to one if
an individual reported consulting a private health care facility and
zero otherwise. This captures the switching effect, or more precisely,
how the user fee policy affected the utilization of private facilities.
The third measure is equal to one if an individual reported having
made any consultation (publicly supported or private) and it mea-
sures the overall increase or reduction in health care use following
the removal of user fees.
We point out that we only focus on utilization of formal private
medical care. Individuals who reported consulting non-science-
based care such as traditional or spiritual healers, constituting a
very small share, e.g., 1% in 2010 (CSO, 2012), are classified as
not having consulted any formal care. We do this also for individ-
uals who reported self-medication, some of whom could have
accessed drugs from informal drug stores. Drug stores and pharma-
cies are not classified as health facilities and are thus not part of
the options for ‘‘type of facility visited” in the survey. However,
such spending is included in total household medical expenditure.
Additionally, faith-based facilities, constituting about 6% of
health facilities may fair better in quality than government facili-
ties, a fact observed in many LMIC (Das et al., 2008). Thus, even if
user fees were removed in both these publicly supported facilities,
it would have been interesting to assess heterogeneous utilization
responses in the two types of facilities. However, we are not able to
conduct such an analysis. The challenge is that, due to the low pro-
portion of mission facilities, estimates are unreliable. Our analysis
thus reviews average effects in publicly supported facilities.
Medical expenditure in our data refers to the amount spent on
consultation, medical examinations, drugs, and any form of self-
medication in the past two weeks for individuals who reported
being sick or injured regardless of where the spending took place,
e.g., publicly supported, private health facility, drug store, etc. We
define two measures of spending, one that looks at the proportione Increase Utilization and Reduce Spending? Heterogeneity and Long-Term
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Table 1
Description of Treatment and Control groups
Group Description N
T1 Individuals residing in the 54 districts where user fees were removed in April 2006 at the primary level in all publicly supported health care
facilities. User fees were maintained in the rest of the districts (18).
23,403
T2 Individuals residing in the rural areas of the 18 districts. They were affected by the second wave of removals in June 2007a 4,140
Control Individuals residing in urban areas of the 18 districts. These were not affected by the two waves of the removal policy in 2006 and 2007 10,514
a The precise identification of these areas would require GPS coordinates which were unfortunately not collected in the surveys. We use the rural (urban) definition of the
Central Statistical Office (CSO) to classify the areas in the 18 districts as treated (control). Our definition appears to distinguish treated and untreated areas in the 18 district
very well. See Appendix A.1 for details.
P. Hangoma et al. /World Development xxx (2017) xxx–xxx 5of individuals that incurred any spending (extensive margin) and
the other measure which assesses the level of spending conditional
on it being positive (intensive margin).
All outcomes are conditional on reporting any illness or injury
in the two weeks prior to the survey.(b) Identification and data description
We define the first wave of removal of user fees in early 2006 as
Treatment 1 (T1) and the second wave of removals in June 2007 as
Treatment 2 (T2). These two waves of removals partitioned the
whole country such that only urban areas of the 18 districts
remained unaffected, and these areas represent our control group.
Individuals who reside in the areas where T1 was effected are
defined as the T1 group. Using the T1 group and the control, we
are able to identify the short-term (2006) and long-term (2010)
effect of the first wave of removals, T1. Individuals residing in
the rural areas of the 18 urban districts who were affected by the
second wave of removals, T2, in 2007 are defined as the T2 group.
This treatment group enables us to identify the effect, in 2010, of
the second wave of removals. Table 1 briefly describes our treat-
ment and control groups.
Given multiple waves of data, we exploit geographical variation
in the removal policy and use difference-in-difference models to
estimate the short-term (2006) and long-term (2010) effects of
providing free care in publicly supported health facilities. This is
an intention-to-treat (ITT) effect of the removal policy. This is
because, although the removal policy was meant for the primary
level, it later allowed health facility officials, as discussed in Sec-
tion 2, to offer free services at the secondary and tertiary level in
some areas. Thus, for those who reported visiting a hospital in
our data, we are not able to distinguish whether they went to a
paying one or not. But even where services were supposed to be
free, compliance may not have been perfect. With deviation from
policy and less than full compliance, ITT, though more conserva-
tive, is a more policy relevant effect.6
Our identifying assumption is that, in the absence of the
removal policy, potential outcomes in areas where user fees were
removed would have followed the same trend as non-treatment
outcomes in the areas where user fees were not removed. A depar-
ture from trend is counted as the effect of the policy. This identify-
ing assumption is fundamental in the difference-in-difference
framework and it is called the parallel trends assumption. Parallel
trends does not require that treated and control groups are the
same, but that pre-treatment outcomes follow similar trends
(Godlonton & Okeke, 2016). Formally, this assumption is assessed
by checking that the differences in outcomes between the treated
and control groups are the same at all time periods before treat-6 Hadley (2011) documents cases were some health facilities charged different
types of fees after the official fees were removed. Masiye et al. (2016) also found that
some individuals reported having paid for care in primary publicly supported health
centers even after the national-wide removal of user fees in 2013. ITT would only
equal the average treatment on the treated (ATT) if there was full compliance and no
policy deviations.
Please cite this article in press as: Hangoma, P., et al. Does Free Public Health Car
Effects. World Development (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2017.0ment (pre-treatment period). This implies that in a difference-in-
difference model, if the pre-treatment interaction (treatment)
effects are included, they should be zero, or statistically insignifi-
cant. We conduct placebo tests by including these pre-treatment
treatment effects in our models. First, we visually assess this
assumption.7(i) Assessment of pre-treatment trends
The T1 and control group exhibited similar trends in utilization
of publicly supported health facilities and private health facilities
as well as both measures of medical spending throughout the
pre-treatment period (1998–04) (Fig. 2).
For the T2 group and control, utilization rates of publicly sup-
ported facilities were the same throughout the pre-treatment per-
iod, as can be seen from the overlapping confidence intervals in the
top left plot of Fig. 3. The same can be said of the utilization of pri-
vate facilities (bottom right of Fig. 3) and both measures of medical
spending (left of Fig. 3).(ii) Baseline covariates and changes over time
The T1 and control group are generally similar in terms of
household and demographic characteristics such as household size,
age, sex, and marital status but differ in characteristics such as
educational level, occupational status, and distance to a health
facility (Table 2, Column (1) and (2)). For instance, 12.2% of house-
hold heads had no education in the T1 group compared to 4% in the
control group. Only 16.9% of individuals in the T1 group had their
nearest health facility within 1 km compared to 45.6% in the con-
trol group. Although the T1 group had significantly fewer house-
hold heads who were unemployed, it also had a substantially
lower proportion of household heads formally employed. Rather
than the requirement that these characteristics (covariates) be
the same in treated and control groups, what is important for
our identification strategy is that changes in these covariates in
the post-treatment period should be the same. Otherwise they
could actually be the ones driving differences in utilization and
medical spending that we could attribute to the removal policy.
Columns (5) and (6) show that almost all characteristics did not
change differently in the post-treatment period.
Table 3 presents a comparison of characteristics in the T2 and
control group. The picture is generally similar to that of the T1
and control group; although the T2 and control groups are broadly
the same in terms of household and demographic characteristics
such as household size, age, sex, and marital status, the T2 group
is worse-off in terms of characteristics such as educational level,
occupational status, and distance to a health facility (Table 3, Col-
umn (1) and (2)). However, these characteristics generally change
in the same way in the two groups over time.7 They are termed ‘‘pre-treatment treatment effects” because they try to measure
the impact of the policy before it was actually implemented (treatment effect in the
pre-treatment period). Pre-treatment treatment effects are not supposed to be
significant if treated and control groups were being affected equally by other factors.
If they are significant, then the true treatment effect is not identified.
e Increase Utilization and Reduce Spending? Heterogeneity and Long-Term
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Figure 2. Figure shows trends in average utilization and spending, and the associated 95% confidence intervals, for T1 group and control. The plots on the left show the
percentage of individuals utilizing publicly supported health facilities (top) and private health facilities (bottom). On the right, we show the percentage of individuals
incurring any spending (top) and conditional spending in natural logarithms (bottom).
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Our econometric model for evaluating the impact of the two
waves of the removal of user fees, T1 and T2, is a difference-in-














where yit is the observed outcome for individual i in year t. The vari-
ables yr1998, yr2002, yr2006, and yr2010 are year dummies. They
account for changes that may have affected utilization and medical
spending in both treatment and control groups, typically national-
level policies or economic shocks. The baseline year is 2004. T1i is
a treatment indicator equal to 1 if individual i is in the T1 group,
i.e., resides in any of the 54 treated districts. Similarly, T2i is 1 if
they reside in the rural areas of the other 18 districts. T1i and T2i
captures the influence of unobserved factors which are specific to
these areas and have the potential to explain differences in utiliza-
tion and medical spending between each treatment group and the
control. Xit is a set of individual and household observable charac-
teristics of i, e.g., education, employment status, household charac-Please cite this article in press as: Hangoma, P., et al. Does Free Public Health Car
Effects. World Development (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2017.0teristics, distance to health facility, etc. They account for any time
varying individual and household characteristics that may have
had differential impact on outcomes of treated and control groups.
Pr is the rth province dummy, for R ¼ 9, while Pr  yrt are province
by year dummies. They capture regional-level fixed effects and
time-varying shocks that may have affected the treated and control
groups differently. Supposing this is a linear model, the short-term
difference-in-difference effect of T1 is given by the coefficient of the
first interaction term d3, while the coefficient on second interaction
term, d4, gives the long-term effect of T1. We measure the effect of
the second wave of user fee removals, T2, by the coefficient, d5. As a
placebo test to formally assess the plausibility of the parallel trends
assumption, a full set of pre-treatment interaction effects for both
T1 and T2 are included. d6 and d7 should be zero if the T1 group
and control followed similar pre-treatment trends. In the same vein,
d8; d9, and d10 should not be statistically different from zero if the T2
group and control followed similar pre-treatment trends.
To ensure that standard errors are not underestimated since the
policy was implemented at the district level while the data are at
the individual level, we cluster the standard errors at the district
level (Bertrand, Duflo, & Mullainathan, 2004).(a) Utilization
All three measures of utilization (public, private, and any uti-
lization) are binary. For each of these outcomes, we fitted a Lineare Increase Utilization and Reduce Spending? Heterogeneity and Long-Term
5.040
Figure 3. Figure shows trends in average utilization and spending, and the associated 95% confidence intervals, for the T2 group and control. The plots on the left show the
percentage of individuals utilizing publicly supported health facilities (top) and private health facilities (bottom). On the right, we show the percentage of individuals
incurring any spending (top) and conditional spending in natural logarithms (bottom).
P. Hangoma et al. /World Development xxx (2017) xxx–xxx 7Probability Model (LPM) to Eqn. (1). Thus, the effect of the user fee
removal policy are simply the coefficients, d3; d4, and d5. To save
space, we only report these effects and the pre-treatment interac-
tion coefficients d6; d7; d8; d9, and d10.
To understand the distributional impact of the removal policy,
we examine how utilization of various individuals across the
socioeconomic distribution was affected. These socioeconomic
variables should not have been affected by the removal policy.
Thus, rather than focusing on income or household consumption,
we look at educational level and occupation of the head of house-
hold. We categorize these variables and estimate a difference-in-
difference model for each of these categories (sub-samples). Focus-
ing on T1, we estimate the overall effect for each sub-sample, as
opposed to short- and long-term effects as we did in Eqn. (1), in
order to concentrate on examining heterogeneities.
Thus, for each of the sub-samples of these variables, we fit a
difference-in-difference model of the form:









ðPr  yrtÞ þ ijt ð2Þ
where posti is 1 if an individual was observed in 2006 or 2010. Our
parameter of interest, which we report for each sub-sample, is h3.
This analysis will give us an insight into which socioeconomic group
began utilizing any health services after the removal (uptake effect)
and which ones could have been switching from private to publiclyPlease cite this article in press as: Hangoma, P., et al. Does Free Public Health Car
Effects. World Development (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2017.0supported facilities where user fees were removed. Thus, we
focused on two outcomes, any utilization and private utilization.(b) Medical spending
As is common in household expenditure data, our medical
spending data have many zeros and is particularly skewed. This
is especially true because the removal policy eliminated medical
spending for some individuals. Although OLS on log-transformed
spending is simple and deals with the skewness problem, it yields
biased estimates because it ignores the existence of zero expendi-
ture. It is important to study the impact of the policy on the full
distribution of medical spending. To achieve this, we examined
the policy effect on two margins of the expenditure distribution,
the extensive margin—whether or not an individual incurred any
spending—and the intensive margin—the amount of spending con-
ditional on it being positive. We then combined these two effects
to yield a measure of the impact of the policy on the whole (uncon-
ditional) distribution of medical spending. This was achieved using
a two-part model (TPM).
In the TPM, the extensive margin (first part) is modeled by fit-
ting a probit model to Eqn. (1) and the intensive margin (second
part) similarly fits Eqn. (1) using generalized linear models
(GLM). The Box Cox test is used to select the link function while
the family is chosen using the modified Park test. This leads us to
a gamma family with a logarithmic link function.e Increase Utilization and Reduce Spending? Heterogeneity and Long-Term
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Table 3
Baseline and changes in characteristics: T2 Group vs Control
Variable Baseline (2004) Average Change: 1998–2004 Change: 2002–2004 Change: 2004–2006 Change: 2004–2010
T2 Group Control DT2 ¼ DControl DT2 ¼ DControl DT2 ¼ DControl DT2 ¼ DControl
(p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Male 0.399 0.453 0.427 0.357 0.061 0.023
HH Male 0.811 0.750 0.062 0.116 0.009 0.235
H Size 5.749 6.072 0.890 0.483 0.897 0.101
Age 25.299 27.397 0.229 0.595 0.859 0.313
HH Married 0.794 0.659 0.016 0.083 0.024 0.260
HH College 0.016 0.121 0.540 0.930 0.797 0.416
HH Secondary 0.636 0.277 0.648 0.413 0.981 0.621
HH Primary 0.253 0.562 0.888 0.144 0.534 0.358
HH No Education 0.095 0.040 0.794 0.730 0.439 0.274
HH Employed 0.131 0.418 0.087 0.114 0.900 0.893
HH Self Employed 0.123 0.306 0.344 0.919 0.168 0.819
HH Farming 0.684 0.071 0.365 0.073 0.520 0.866
HH Not Working 0.061 0.205 0.588 0.929 0.680 0.655
Distance to Nearest Health Facility
61 km 0.178 0.456 0.063 0.788 0.020 0.691
1–10 Kms 0.644 0.529 0.029 0.159 0.111 0.342
11–20 Kms 0.131 0.000 0.274 0.513 0.846 0.253
P21 Kms 0.047 0.015 0.711 0.501 0.704 0.183
Note: The table shows characteristics of individuals aged 5 to 65 who reported being sick or injured in the two weeks prior to each survey in the T2 group and control. The first
and second columns report means of covariates at baseline (2004) for treated and control group, respectively. The rest of the columns report p-values that compare changes in
the control and treated group from baseline to the relevant survey year. The p-values where computed using a simple difference-in-difference model of each characteristic
(covariate). HH = Household Head and H = Household. All variables are dummies except H Size, and Age.
Table 2
Baseline and changes in characteristics: T1 Group vs Control
Variable Baseline (2004) Average Change: 1998–2004 Change: 2002–2004 Change: 2004–2006 Change: 2004–2010
T1 Group Control DT1 ¼ DControl DT1 ¼ DControl DT1 ¼ DControl DT1 ¼ DControl
(p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Male 0.428 0.453 0.262 0.876 0.796 0.153
HH Male 0.784 0.750 0.045 0.348 0.424 0.779
H Size 6.165 6.072 0.786 0.670 0.882 0.161
Age 27.382 27.397 0.120 0.418 0.857 0.129
HH Married 0.768 0.659 0.013 0.146 0.100 0.217
HH College 0.048 0.121 0.866 0.725 0.978 0.588
HH Secondary 0.287 0.562 0.157 0.130 0.575 0.029
HH Primary 0.542 0.277 0.052 0.446 0.750 0.383
HH No Education 0.122 0.040 0.359 0.075 0.544 0.104
HH Employed 0.143 0.418 0.069 0.004 0.773 0.165
HH Self-Employed 0.090 0.306 0.054 0.055 0.394 0.450
HH Farming 0.707 0.071 0.831 0.000 0.143 0.006
HH Not Working 0.061 0.205 0.479 0.934 0.292 0.189
Distance to Nearest Health Facility
61 km 0.169 0.456 0.007 0.381 0.616 0.839
1–10 Kms 0.612 0.529 0.029 0.159 0.462 0.172
11–20 Kms 0.146 0.000 0.980 0.241 0.182 0.003
P21 Kms 0.073 0.015 0.326 0.605 0.807 0.046
Note: The table shows characteristics of individuals aged 5 to 65 who reported being sick or injured in the two weeks prior to each survey in the T1 group and control. The first
and second columns report means of covariates at baseline (2004) for treated and control group, respectively. The rest of the columns report p-values that compare changes in
the control and treated group from baseline to the relevant survey year. The p-values where computed using a simple difference-in-difference model of each characteristic
(covariate). HH = Household Head and H = Household. All variables are dummies except H Size, and Age.
8 P. Hangoma et al. /World Development xxx (2017) xxx–xxxBecause probit is a non-linear model, the interaction or mar-
ginal effect of the policy are not given by the interaction terms in
Eqn. (1) (Ai & Norton, 2003). For the extensive margin (first part)
thus, each interaction effect, e.g., for T1 in 2006, was computed





ð3ÞPlease cite this article in press as: Hangoma, P., et al. Does Free Public Health Car
Effects. World Development (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2017.0where U is the normal cumulative distribution function and the
matrix X contains all covariates including region, other interaction
terms, and year dummies.
For the second part (the GLM), the interaction effect was simi-
larly computed as in Eqn. (3), although U is simply an exponent.
The overall effect on medical spending (unconditional medical
spending) was estimated by combining the effect of the removal
policy on each of two parts of the TPM. To see this, note that the
unconditional expected value of medical spending is the joint
expected value of medical spending, E½y, which in turn is givene Increase Utilization and Reduce Spending? Heterogeneity and Long-Term
5.040
Table 4
Short- and long-term effects of user fee removal on overall, public, and private facility utilization
Overall utilization Public utilization Private utilization
(1) (2) (3)
Short-term effect
T1  yr2006 0:062ð0:029Þ 0:100ð0:030Þ 0:034ð0:017Þ
Long-term effects
T1  yr2010 0:080ð0:032Þ 0:111ð0:035Þ 0:032ð0:014Þ
T2  yr2010 0:111ð0:048Þ 0:137ð0:047Þ 0:027ð0:016Þ
Pre-treatment effects
T1  yr1998 0:000ð0:036Þ 0:004ð0:033Þ 0:004ð0:022Þ
T2  yr1998 0:018ð0:064Þ 0:006ð0:064Þ 0:011ð0:023Þ
T1  yr2002 0:004ð0:030Þ 0:009ð0:032Þ 0:013ð0:016Þ
T2  yr2002 0:003ð0:061Þ 0:014ð0:059Þ 0:011ð0:016Þ
T2  yr2006 0:078ð0:065Þ 0:093ð0:061Þ 0:015ð0:023Þ
Observations 31;887 31;887 31;887
T1 group baseline mean 0:521 0:497 0:024
T2 group baseline mean 0:447 0:433 0:014
Control group baseline mean 0:575 0:472 0:103
Note: Table shows the effect of the first and second waves of the removal policy, T1 and T2 respectively, on utilization of all facilities (Column 1), publicly supported facilities
(Column 2) and private facilities (Column 3). Estimates are from DD linear probability models (LPM) corresponding to Eqn. (1) and are interpreted as percentage points.
Standard errors clustered at the district level are reported in parentheses. The lower panel gives the baseline (2004) mean of each outcome for treated and control groups. All
models include a full set of year dummies, regional effects, and region by year interaction effects. Covariates include distance to health facility, household size, sex, age, and
age squared of an individual, as well as household head characteristics such as occupational status, marital status, and educational level.
⁄Significant at 10%; ⁄⁄Significant at 5%; ⁄⁄⁄Significant at 1%.
P. Hangoma et al. /World Development xxx (2017) xxx–xxx 9by the product of the probability of incurring any spending—the
probit part—and the average spending, given that spending is pos-
itive—the GLM part:
E½y ¼ UðÞ  E½yjy > 0 ð4Þ
The impact of the policy is given by how it changes this joint
expeted value. For example, the effect of T1 on overall medical
spending in 2006 is given by taking the double difference (similar
to Eqn. (3)) on Eqn. (4). Taking the double difference is a binary
variable equivalent of differentiating the joint expectation twice.8
Standard errors are computed using a bootstrap procedure with
1000 replications that account for clustering at the district level.
5. Results
(a) Impact on individual utilization
(i) Overall impact
Results indicate that the removal of user fees in publicly
supported health facilities increased overall utilization of health
services (uptake effect), in addition to shifting use from private
to publicly supported facilities (switching effect). However, the
uptake effect was much greater, and stronger, than the switching
effect (Table 4). In particular, The first wave of user fee removals,
T1, increased overall utilization (uptake) of health services by 6.2
percentage points (pp) in the short term (Column (1)). The effect
strengthened to 8 pp in the long term. However, utilization of pub-
licly supported facilities increased more than the increase in over-
all utilization of health services in both the short- and long-term
Column (2) shows that utilization of publicly supported facilities
increased by 10 pp in the short-term and the effect was sustained
at 11.1 pp in the long-term. The extra increase in utilization of pub-
licly supported facilities was a result of switching from private- to
publicly supported-facilities (Column(3)). Utilization of private
facilities in the T1 group reduced by 3.4 pp in the short term with
the effect sustained at 3.2 pp in the long term.
The second wave of removals (T2) increased the overall utiliza-
tion of health services by 11.1 pp. Utilization of publicly supported8 See Frondel and Vance (2013) for a discussion on interaction effects in non-linear
two-part models.
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from private facilities, although the switching effect was not signif-
icant. This insignificance is expected given the small proportion of
individuals utilizing private facilities in T2 areas which renders
standard errors to be imprecisely estimated.
All pre-treatment ‘‘treatment effects” for T1 are zero. The effect
of the first wave of removals, T1, is thus identified. Similarly, all
pre-treatment effects for T2 are not significantly different from
zero. This suggests that utilization in the T2 group and the control
also followed approximately parallel trends. This lends support to
descriptive evidence of parallel trends on Fig. 2 in Section 3(a(i)).(ii) Heterogeneous impact
Table 5 shows how individuals from different socioeconomic
backgrounds responded to the removal of user fees. The policy
increased overall utilization of health services (uptake) more for
individuals from lower socioeconomic background than their
better-off counterparts (Table 5). For individuals from higher
socioeconomic background, the policy led to a shift in care seeking
from private to publicly supported facilities (switching).
Beginning with education level, uptake was greater the lower
the educational level of the head of household (Column (1)).
Specifically, individuals whose household heads had no education
increased their utilization most (10.6 pp). Uptake significantly
increased by 6.2 pp for individuals whose household heads only
had primary education and, although positive, the increase was
not significant for individuals whose household heads had a sec-
ondary or college education. On the other hand, switching was
generally driven by individuals coming from household heads with
higher education (Column (2)).
For occupation status, uptake significantly increased by 11.2 pp
for individuals whose household heads were not employed.
Although positive, the overall use of health services did not
increase significantly for individuals whose households heads were
formally or self-employed. For individuals engaged in farming, the
policy did not affect uptake. It however shifted their care seeking
from private to publicly supported facilities. Individuals whose
household heads were formally employed, despite not registering
a statistically significant increase in uptake, also shifted care seek-
ing from private to publicly supported facilities following the
removal of user fees.e Increase Utilization and Reduce Spending? Heterogeneity and Long-Term
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Table 5
Heterogeneous effect of user fee removal on utilization
Overall utilization Private utilization
(1) (2)
Education Level of Household Head




Occupation of Household Head
Not Employed 0:112ð0:050Þ 0:018ð0:017Þ
Self Employed 0:024ð0:041Þ 0:011ð0:017Þ
Farming 0:003ð0:042Þ 0:077ð0:021Þ
Formally Employed 0:043ð0:038Þ 0:045ð0:020Þ
Note: Table shows the effect of the first wave of the user fee removal policy, T1, on
utilization of all facilities (Column 1) and private facilities (Column 2) by educa-
tional level and occupational status of the head of household. Each reported coef-
ficient is an estimate of h3 in a DD linear probability model (LPM) based on Eqn. (2).
Thus, it is interpreted as a percentage point. Standard errors clustered at the district
level are reported in parentheses. All models include a full set of year dummies,
regional effects, and region by year interaction effects. Covariates include distance
to health facility, household size, sex, age, and age squared of an individual, as well
as household head characteristics such as marital status.
⁄Significant at 10%; ⁄⁄Significant at 5%; ⁄⁄⁄Significant at 1%.
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The two waves of the removal policy significantly reduced the
proportion of individuals incurring any medical spending but
increased medical spending for those who continued to incur it,
although this increase was not statistically significant (Table 6).
As a consequence, both waves of the removal policy did not signif-
icantly impact overall medical spending.
The first wave of removals, T1, reduced the likelihood of incur-
ring any spending in the short-term by 26.6 pp, and this effect
reduced slightly to 19.3 pp in the long-term (Column 1, Table 6).
These effects are highly significant at the 1% level. On the other
hand, the second wave, T2, reduced the likelihood of incurring
any spending by 8.7 pp. This effect is significant at the 10% level.
On the other hand, estimates at the intensive margin (GLM part—
Column 2) show that the amount of spending (conditional spend-
ing) did not change following the removal of user fees in the T1 and
T2 groups. In fact, though not statistically significant, there was an
upward pressure on the amount of spending. This upward pressure
dampened the reduction in spending that resulted from reduced
probability of incurring any spending. Thus, unconditional spend-
ing was left unchanged (Column 3).
All pre-treatment interaction effects for extensive (any spend-
ing) and intensive (conditional spending) part of medical spending
are not statistically different from zero.(c) Robustness
To assess the validity of our findings, we carried out a number of
robustness checks (See the Appendix for details). First, a fully flex-
ible difference-in-difference model proposed by Mora and Reggio
(2012) and Mora (2015) was used to further test the common
trends assumption. The assumption was met for all outcomes
(Appendix A.2). Second, since our analysis is at the individual level
while treatment varied at the regional level, we assessed the sen-
sitivity of our findings to inclusion of an important regional-level
variable, district funding.9 The inclusion of this key variable did
not change our results (Appendix A.3). Third, the performance of
difference-in-difference models can be assessed on how sensitive9 Unfortunately, district funding was not available for 1998, 2002 and 2010. Hence,
we could not include this variable in the main analysis.
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all models without covariates and with a limited set of covariates.
Results were broadly similar (Appendix A.3). Fourth, we investigated
whether the likelihood of reporting sickness or injury did not change
differently between treated and control areas. If it did, there would
be a possibility that the observed effects are actually driven by dif-
ferential changes in sickness and not the policy change. Results show
that changes in likelihood of reporting sickness and injury in treated
and control areas were not different (Appendix A.4).
Fifth, we conducted tests to assess whether other factors (vari-
ables) were being affected which the user fee removal policy is not
expected to affect. If these other variables were being affected,
then there is a high chance that the effects we observe were actu-
ally not caused by the removal policy, but by other things. This fal-
sification exercise ruled out such a possibility (Appendix A.5).
Sixth, and lastly, we conducted randomization tests, which apart
from ruling out rival explanations for the observed effects, also
ensure that we do not falsely claim that results are significant
when in fact not. This problem may arise because in difference-
in-difference models with multiple time points, standard errors
may be underestimated due to serial correlation (Bertrand et al.,
2004). We did not find evidence that our standard errors could
have been underestimated or that the effects were driven by rival
explanations (Appendix A.6).6. Discussion
Using data from Zambia, this paper shows that observed short-
term increases in utilization of publicly supported facilities follow-
ing the fall in price of care—due to removal of user fees—do not dis-
appear in the long term. One possible explanation for these
sustained effects could be that there were no significant supply—
side constraints that could have lowered quality of care, and even-
tually health care use. An alternative hypothesis is that individuals
care more about price than quality so that a fall in price accompa-
nied by a fall in quality does not eventually reduce the initial
increases in utilization. Two findings emerge from our study that
may support this hypothesis. First, increases in overall use of care,
or uptake—which accounted for most of the increase in use of pub-
licly supported facilities—was driven by individuals from low
socioeconomic backgrounds, a segment of the population that is
likely to be more sensitive to price than quality (Ching, 1995;
Gertler, Locay, & Sanderson, 1987). This effect was slightly larger
in the long term. Second, and on the contrary, switching from pri-
vate facilities—driven by relatively well-off individuals —was smal-
ler, and actually insignificant for the T2 group, in the long term.
Well-off individuals are likely to be more quality than price sensi-
tive. These two findings suggests that utilization would be sus-
tained in the long term even when the quality of care falls.
In fact, evidence suggests that quality of care may have fallen
following user fee removal. For example, some publicly supported
health facilities were not able to provide complete services such as
drugs, medical examinations, etc., to match the increased demand
so that individuals had to rely on the private market for these ser-
vices (Hadley, 2011; Masiye et al., 2010; Ministry of Health, 2007;
Onde, 2009).
This evidence on supply side constraints may also explain our
finding that, on average, household medical spending did not
reduce, even after the removal of user fees (recall that we look at
spending regardless of utilizing any facility, and hence also capture
spending in private drug shops). This finding is supported by stud-
ies showing that spending in both publicly supported facilities and
private pharmacies/drug shops remained prevalent. For example,
Hadley (2011) found that even after user fees were removed, there
were additional payments for things such as having childrene Increase Utilization and Reduce Spending? Heterogeneity and Long-Term
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Table 6
Short- and long-term marginal effects of the removal of user fees on overall medical spending
Any spending Conditional spending Unconditional spending
(Probit part) (GLM part) (Probit þ GLM)
(1) (2) (3)
Short-term effect
T1  yr2006 0:266ð0:036Þ 3:290ð14:751Þ 6:216ð12:653Þ
Long-term effects
T1  yr2010 0:193ð0:047Þ 17:055ð12:546Þ 2:755ð6:598Þ
T2  yr2010 0:087ð0:050Þ 6:775ð10:981Þ 1:840ð5:130Þ
Pre-treatment effects
T1  yr2002 0:005ð0:040Þ 12:250ð24:527Þ 3:773ð11:093Þ
T2  yr2002 0:003ð0:052Þ 19:567ð22:259Þ 6:797ð10:372Þ
T2  yr2006 0:050ð0:046Þ 0:706ð15:928Þ 2:249ð10:444Þ
Observations 26;705 13;315
T1 group baseline mean 0:607 17:177
T2 group baseline mean 0:580 13:851
Control group baseline mean 0:706 51:459
Note: Table shows the effect of the first and second wave of the removal policy, T1 and T2 respectively, on medical spending for all individual who reported being sick or
injured. Bootstrap standard errors (1000 replications) clustered at the district level are reported in parentheses. Estimates are from a two-part model where the first part
(Column 1) models the probability of incurring any spending (extensive margin) using a probit model of Eqn. (1) with the 1998 year dummy dropped. The marginal effects of
the probit model are computed according to Eqn. (3). The second part (Column 2) are effects of the policy on the intensive margin–amount of spending conditional on one
having incurred any. The amounts are marginal effects computed according to Eqn. (3) from a GLM regression model (Gamma distribution and log-link) on Eqn. (1). Column
(3) presents the effect of the policy on the whole conditional mean of medical spending (combination of the extensive and intensive margin). The lower panel gives the
baseline (2004) mean of each outcome for treated and control groups. All models include a full set of year dummies, regional effects, and region by year interaction effects.
Covariates include household size, distance to health facility, sex, age, and age squared of an individual, as well as household head characteristics such as occupational status,
marital status, and educational level.
⁄Significant at 10%; ⁄⁄Significant at 5%; ⁄⁄⁄Significant at 1%.
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and book fees for maintaining medical records, among others.
These additional charges are informal since all primary health ser-
vices were to be free at the point of use. Hadley (2011) also found
that even when drugs were available in health facilities, patients
would be given prescriptions to buy drugs from private drug
stores, most of which were owned by health facility workers.
Under such circumstances, it is not surprising that even if the
proportion of people incurring any medical spending reduced,
some people experienced an economically relevant, albeit statisti-
cally insignificant, increase in spending. It should be noted that
even if the proportion of people incurring any spending (condi-
tional spending) may have reduced, the absolute numbers may still
increase due to the increase in utilization of health care. These peo-
ple were, on average, now spending more than before the removal
of user fees, and as mentioned earlier, this could have been for
things like drugs in the private pharmacies and informal charges.
User fee removal policies may thus induce such unintended effects
especially if supply—side constraints are not looked at carefully.
The increase in conditional spending appears to have diluted the
reduction in spending that those who did not incur any spending
experienced, so that average spending did not change significantly
after removal of user fees.10 Evidence from Uganda also shows that
removal of user fees did not reduce household medical spending
(Nabyonga Orem et al., 2011; Xu et al., 2006). Studies in Zambia have
documented catastrophic spending for individuals visiting publicly
supported health facilities even after the nationwide removal of user
fees (Masiye et al., 2016). As mentioned in Section 1, the health
insurance literature shows that even when some segments of popu-10 That total medical spending was unchanged is also consistent with the National
Health Accounts (NHA) for Zambia which reviewed that the household share in Total
Health Expenditure (THE) was 27% in 2006, increasing from 26.8 in 2005 (Ministry of
Health, 2009). Actually, data show that household share in THE was, on average,
higher in the period following the removal of user fees (World Health Organization,
2015).
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hold medical spending may still not fall.
Coming back to findings on utilization, our results can be com-
pared, and contrasted, with experimental evidence. A few of these
studies find that removing user fees or providing health insurance
does not increase overall use (uptake) of care but simply generate
a switching effect (Levine, Polimeni, & Ramage, 2016; Powell-
Jackson et al., 2015). Although we find evidence of switching in
our natural experiment, our findings show that the increase in over-
all use of health service (uptake effect) was actually larger, and
much stronger, than the switching effect. To the best of our knowl-
edge, our study is the first to separate the magnitude of uptake and
switching effects for a complex policy implemented at national
scale. Mwabu et al. (1995) conducted a descriptive study of the
effect of a temporary suspension of user fees in two districts of
Kenya and found that utilization of publicly supported facilities
increased while that of private facilities declined. Their analysis
analysis was however unable to tease out the magnitude of the
increase in overall use of health services. Moreover, since it was a
before and after study without a control group, it is hard to deter-
mine whether or not the observed changes in utilization patterns
were due to the removal of user fees or other concurrent factors.
The welfare implication of our findings are not straight forward.
On one side, welfare may have increased if the improved access to
care by individuals of poor socioeconomic backgrounds reduced
the duration as well as severity of their sickness. In this instance,
the effect of such sickness on their labor productivity and earnings
would have been eased. On the other side, if care was of poor qual-
ity, increased access may not have impacted positively on their
health. In this case, the removal policy may have reduced welfare
as resources were not being used efficiently.(a) Limitations
The key limitation of our study is the non-availability of GPS
information to exactly classify which households could have beene Increase Utilization and Reduce Spending? Heterogeneity and Long-Term
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Despite the fact that our classification performs extremely well,
the long-term estimates are lower bound if there was any
misclassification.
Secondly, our measure of medical spending does not fully char-
acterize health expenditure because Living Conditions Monitoring
Surveys only collects spending on consultation, purchase of drugs,
and examinations. This leaves out other significant health care-
related costs such as transportation which in some cases are more
significant than payments at the point of care.
7. Conclusion
Consensus appears to have emerged that removing user fees is
an effective strategy for improving Universal Health Coverage
(UHC). A number of low- and middle-income countries have since
removed user fees while others are considering to do so. The con-
sensus draws heavily on studies that report dramatic increases in
utilization. However, due to methodological and data limitations,
the demand consequences, including changes in household spend-
ing, of such complex policy interventions still remain unclear.
To contribute in filling this gap in the literature, we exploit the
step-wise implementation of removal of user fees in Zambia to cre-
ate treatment and control groups, and use large nationally repre-
sentative household surveys for the period 1998–10 to estimates
effects in a difference-in-difference framework.
We find that the twowaves of the user fee removal policy signif-
icantly increased overall rates of care seeking and led to a small shift
in care seeking from private to publicly supported facilities in both
the short and long terms. Overall rates of care seeking increased
more for individuals from lower socioeconomic backgrounds.
Despite the fact that the removal policy reduced the financial barrier
to access by reducing the proportion of individual incurring any
spending (extensive margin), and thus significantly increasing uti-
lization, it exerted an upward pressure on spending for those who
were incurring any spending (intensive margin/conditional spend-
ing). The intensive and extensive margin worked in opposite direc-
tions to leave total (unconditional) medical spending unchanged.
We conclude that free health care policies such as removing
user fees may improve access to care but more attention should
be given to supply—side factors, such as quality of care and ade-
quacy of funding, to ensure that improved access translates into
health improvements and reduced household expenditure.
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A.1. Assessing treatment classification for T2
The second wave of the removal policy, T2, extended the
removal of user fees to the T2 group—rural areas of the remaining
18 districts. However, the rural/urban classification of areas within
these 18 districts in our data is not exactly the same as defined in
the removal policy. The classification in the data uses a more
detailed criterion while the removal policy defined rural areas only
on the basis of radius distance from the district administration cen-
ters of each of the 18 districts. Specifically, user fees were removed
in all primary health facilities located outside a radius of 15 or
20 km from the districts centers, depending on localization relative
to the line of rail. Ideally, we would need GPS coordinates for both
households and facilities to precisely determine which household
is actually located in a treated area. However, GPS coordinates
were not collected in the surveys.
Since distances in the removal policy were determined in such a
way that health facilities exempted from user fees would serve
rural households, we use the rural classification from the Central
Statistical Office (CSO) in the data to define a household as treated
(belonging to the T2 group) if it is located in an enumeration area
that is classified as rural. The classification of enumeration areas as
either rural or urban by CSO is based on population size, economic
activity (agricultural or not), and presence of basic modern facili-
ties such as piped water, tarred roads, post office, and other ser-
vices (CSO, 2012).
To assess how well this rural/urban definitions in the data (by
CSO) performs in distinguishing treated from non-treated individ-
uals, we check how the proportion of individuals incurring any
medical spending changed between rural areas (supposedly
treated-T2 group) and urban areas (supposedly controls). It is
expected that after the removal of user fees in 2007, this measure
falls significantly in areas that are supposedly treated, while it
should be non-decreasing in areas deemed as controls. The data
show that while the proportion of individuals incurring any spend-
ing in the supposedly treated areas fell by almost 20 percentage
points (pp) between 2006 and 2010, it was almost unchanged in
the supposed control (Table 7).A.2. Fully flexible model
The model proposed by Mora and Reggio (2012) provides an
alternative way of estimating the treatment effect of the removalControl Group
2010 2002 2004 2006 2010
40:17 69:08 80.99 79.45 81.17
7.17 42.68 43.10 45.53 30.68
1,032 1,969 1,972 1,586 2,391
osed to computing spending for all individuals who reported being sick or injured as
ly supported health facilities. Conditional Health Spending is in Zambian Kwacha
e Increase Utilization and Reduce Spending? Heterogeneity and Long-Term
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Table 8
Short- and long-term effects of the removal of user fees: Fully flexible model (Mora, 2015)
PANEL A: Short- and long-term effect under different parallel assumptions
Overall utilization Prob. of medical spending Conditional spending
Parallel-1 Parallel-2 Parallel-3 Parallel-1 Parallel-2 Parallel-1 Parallel-2
T1  yr2006 0:098 0:108 0:090 0:236 0:258 0:060 0:133
ð0:034Þ ð0:057Þ ð0:109Þ ð0:035Þ ð0:060Þ ð0:120Þ ð0:569Þ
T1  yr2010 0:102 0:119 0:066 0:240 0:286 0:019 0:369
ð0:043Þ ð0:096Þ ð0:270Þ ð0:036Þ ð0:102Þ ð0:145Þ ð0:388Þ
Observations 28,232 28,232 28,232 23,783 23,783 11,892 11,892
PANEL B: Test for Common Pre-treatment trends and equality of short- and long-term effects
Overall utilization Prob. of medical spending Conditional spending
F p-value F p-value F p-value
Test for pre-treatment trends
H0: Common Trends 1.051 .5913 0.2805 0.5964 1.772 0.183
Test of equality of short- and long-term effects
Under Parallel-1
H0: T1  yr2006 = T1  yr2010 0.018 0.892 0.024 0.877 0.103 0.748
Under Parallel-2
H0: T1  yr2006 = T1  yr2010 0.067 0.795 0.230 0.631 1.356 0.244
Under Parallel-3
H0: T1  yr2006 = T1  yr2010 0.021 0.885
Note: The table shows OLS estimates in a fully flexible DD model for the T1 group and the control. The short- and long-term effect under parallel-1 assumes parallel paths and
uses only 1 pre-treatment period (2004). The effects under parallel-2 uses the 2004 and 2002 pre-treatment data set and assumes parallel growths in outcomes. Under
parallel-3, all pre-treatment data is used (2004, 2002 & 1998). Parrellel-3 assumes quadratic growth in outcomes. The first test is a test of common trends which is equivalent
to a test that the 3 (or 2 under medical spending) parallel path assumptions are equal. The last three tests checks whether the short-term and long-term effects are equal
under each parallel assumption. Standard errors clustered at the district level are reported in brackets.
⁄Significant at 10%; ⁄⁄Significant at 5%; ⁄⁄⁄Significant at 1%.
P. Hangoma et al. /World Development xxx (2017) xxx–xxx 13policy while at the same time testing for the parallel trends
assumption. As opposed to estimating one treatment effect of an
intervention for each post-treatment data point (e.g., 2006 or
2010)—irrespective of the number of pre-treatment data points–
the model proposed by Mora and Reggio (2012) allows one to esti-
mate r treatment effects for each post-treatment data point, where
r is the number of pre-treatment data points and each effect, br , is
estimated under a different parallel assumption. Only when treat-
ment effects under different parallel assumptions are equivalent is
the parallel trends assumption met, and our assumption of com-
mon trends valid.
The advantage with the method proposed by Mora and Reggio
(2012) is that even if the estimates from one post-treatment data
point, e.g., for T1  2006, under different parallel assumptions
are not equivalent, one is able to check how the effect varies, in
both magnitude and significance across different parallel assump-
tions. Actually, Mora and Reggio (2012) show that the practice of
allowing for flexibility in difference-in-difference models by
including terms such as linear or quadratic trends imply different
identifying assumptions from the ones the authors refer to, so that
the reported effects may not be the true treatment effects.11
We focus on the first wave of removals, T1, and estimate the
fully flexible model on three outcomes, namely, overall (any) uti-
lization, whether an individual incurred any spending or not, and
the amount of spending conditional on spending. Given that we
have three (two) pre-treatment periods for overall utilization
(medical spending), we are able to estimate three (two) short-
term and three (two) long-term effects of T1. For example. the
computation of the three short-term and three long-term effect
for overall utilization follows three stages. Firstly, the first set of
short- and long-term effects is computed using the baseline data
(2004) only. The identifying assumption in this case is the parallel
paths assumption, which Mora and Reggio (2012) term parallel-1.11 They applied their method to papers published in top economics journals and find
that when flexible dynamics are applied, the significance of the results is affected in 6
of the 13 cases and only 3 in 9 cases was the common trends assumption satisfied.
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mated using both the 2004 and 2002 pre-treatment data. The
assumption here is parallel growths, called parallel-2 and it is
equivalent to allowing for linear trends in a difference-in-
difference model. The last set of effects are computed using all
the pre-treatment datasets (1998, 2002, and 2004). This is called
parallel-3 and its equivalent to allowing for quadratic trends in a
difference-in-difference model.
We make use of the Stata package by Mora (2015) and focus on
T1 which gives the short- and long-term effects. The models are
estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS). Thus utilization and
the first part of the two part model of expenditure applies a linear
probability model (LPM) while the second part is OLS on log trans-
formed expenditure.
Estimation results are presented in Table 8. The results are
broadly consistent with our finding in the main analysis although
the estimates and standard errors are slightly larger. Panel B shows
test statistics and p-values for of the parallel trends assumption
test and the equivalence of short- and long-term effects. The com-
mon trends assumption was met for all outcomes, i.e. we do not
reject H0 of common trends at the 10% level. The tests also reveals
that there was not statistically significant difference between
short- and long-term effects.
A.3. Omitted variables and empty models
Although we controlled for individual covariates and included
regional fixed effects as well as year by region effects, there may
be concerns that other district-level time varying characteristics
may bias our estimators. To gauge this possibility, we were able
to collect data on district-level funding. Unfortunately, district
funding was not available for 1998, 2002, and 2010. Hence, we
could not include this variable in the main analysis. However,
the two years, 2004 (before the first intervention) and 2006 (after)
could be used to assess the sensitivity of estimates to possible
omitted time varying district variables. District funding is perhaps
one of the key variables that affects performance, quality of care,e Increase Utilization and Reduce Spending? Heterogeneity and Long-Term
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(Probit part) (GLM part) (Probit þ GLM)
(1) (2) (3)








Table shows the effect of the first wave of the removal policy, T1, on medical
spending for all individual who reported being sick or injured controlling for dis-
trict-level funding. Funding data were only available for 2004 and 2006. Thus,
estimates are only based on the 2004 and 2006 LCMS surveys. Bootstrap standard
errors (1000 replications) clustered at the district level in parentheses. Estimates
are from a two-part model where the first part (Column 1) models the probability of
incurring any spending (extensive margin) using a probit model of Eqn. (1) with the
1998 year dummy dropped. The marginal effects of the probit model are computed
according to Eqn. (3). The second part (Column 2) are effects of the policy on the
intensive margin–amount of spending conditional on one having incurred any. The
amounts are marginal effects computed according to Eqn. (3) from a GLM regres-
sion model (Gamma distribution and log-link) on Eqn. (1). Column (3) presents the
effect of the policy on the whole conditional mean of medical spending (combi-
nation of the extensive and intensive margin). The lower panel gives the baseline
(2004) mean of each outcome for treated and control groups. All models include a
full set of year dummies, regional effects, and region by year interaction effects.
Covariates include household size, distance to health facility, sex, age, and age
squared of an individual, as well as household head characteristics such as occu-
pational status, marital status, and educational level.
⁄Significant at 10%; ⁄⁄Significant at 5%; ⁄⁄⁄Significant at 1%.
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T1  yr2006 0:077ð0:033Þ 0:092ð0:037Þ 0:015ð0:021Þ
Long-term effects
T1  yr2010 0:10:8ð0:042Þ 0:113ð0:040Þ 0:004ð0:016Þ
T2  yr2010 0:154ð0:047Þ 0:159ð0:025Þ 0:005ð0:015Þ
Pre-treatment
T1  yr1998 0:021ð0:039Þ 0:012ð0:031Þ 0:009ð0:023Þ
T2  yr1998 0:027ð0:059Þ 0:012ð0:056Þ 0:015ð0:027Þ
T1  yr2002 0:032ð0:032Þ 0:029ð0:035Þ 0:004ð0:015Þ
T2  yr2002 0:033ð0:052Þ 0:034ð0:050Þ 0:001ð0:014Þ
T2  yr2006 0:072ð0:062Þ 0:072ð0:060Þ 0:001ð0:020Þ










Note: Estimates from a difference-in-difference linear probability model (LPM)
corresponding to Eqn. (1). Estimates are interpreted as percentage points. Standard
errors clustered at the district level are reported in parentheses. All models are
conditional on reporting sickness or injury in the two weeks prior to the survey. All
models include a full set of year dummies, regional effects, and region by year
interaction effects. Covariates include distance to health facility, household size,
sex, age, and age squared of an individual, as well as household head characteristics
such as occupational status, marital status, and educational level.
⁄Significant at 10%; ⁄⁄Significant at 5%; ⁄⁄⁄Significant at 1%.
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T1  yr2006 0:079ð0:033Þ 0:120ð0:032Þ 0:041ð0:019Þ







Note: Table shows the effect of the first wave of the removal policy, T1, on uti-
lization of all facilities (Column 1), publicly supported facilities (Column 2), and
private facilities (Column 3) controlling for district-level funding. Funding data
were only available for 2004 and 2006. Thus, estimates are only based on the 2004
and 2006 LCMS surveys. Reported coefficients are estimates from DD linear prob-
ability models (LPM) corresponding to Eqn. (1) and are interpreted as percentage
points. Standard errors clustered at the district level are reported in parentheses.
The lower panel give the baseline (2004) mean of each outcome for treated and
control groups. All models include a full set of year dummies, regional effects, and
region by year interaction effects. Covariates include district-level funding, distance
to health facility, household size, sex, age, and age squared of an individual, as well
as household head characteristics such as occupational status, marital status, and
educational level.
⁄Significant at 10%; ⁄⁄Significant at 5%; ⁄⁄⁄Significant at 1%.
Table 12






(Probit part) (GLM part) (Probit þ GLM)
(1) (2) (3)
Short-term effect
T1  yr2006 0:223ð0:032Þ 5:080ð12:340Þ 1:824ð6:487Þ
Long-term effects
T1  yr2010 0:186ð0:036Þ 37:494ð17:959Þ 12:011ð6:472Þ
T2  yr2010 0:070ð0:050Þ 10:905ð17:075Þ 9:144ð7:563Þ
Pre-treatment
effects
T1  yr2002 0:025ð0:041Þ 4:747ð13:625Þ 8:663ð7:118Þ
T2  yr2002 0:001ð0:047Þ 0:262ð14:622Þ 8:676ð7:822Þ











Note: Table shows marginal effects from a DD two part model and the combined
effect of the two parts. All amounts are in Zambian Kwacha at 2010 prices. Boot-
strap standard errors (1,000 replications) clustered at the district level are reported
in parentheses. (1) presents probit model marginal effects at the extensive margin
of medical spending (whether one incurred any spending or not). In (2), marginal
effect at the intensive margin (those with positive spending) are presented. (3)
presents the effect of the policy on the whole conditional mean of medical spending
(combination of the extensive and intensive margin). All models include a full set of
year dummies, regional effects, and region by year interaction effects. Covariates
include household size, distance to health facility, sex, age, and age squared of an
individual, as well as household head characteristics such as occupational status,
marital status, and educational level.
⁄Significant at 10%; ⁄⁄Significant at 5%; ⁄⁄⁄Significant at 1%.
14 P. Hangoma et al. /World Development xxx (2017) xxx–xxxand availability of essential services and thus utilization as well as
individual medical spending. The inclusion of this key district-level
variable did not change our results (See Table 9 and 10 in the
Appendix).
Still on the issue of control variables, the performance of
difference-in-difference models can be assessed on how sensitive
the estimates are to the addition of covariates. We estimated all
models without control variables and with a limited set of control
variables and results are presented (Table 11 and 12 in the appen-Please cite this article in press as: Hangoma, P., et al. Does Free Public Health Care Increase Utilization and Reduce Spending? Heterogeneity and Long-Term
Effects. World Development (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2017.05.040
Table 13
Differences in the likelihood of reporting sickness between the treated (T1 & T2) and the control group
T1  yr1998 T1  yr2002 T1  yr2006 T1  yr2010 T2  yr1998 T2  yr2002 T2  yr2006 T2  yr2010
0:015 0:004 0:000 0:010 0:004 0:020 0:021 0:039
ð0:013Þ ð0:012Þ ð0:008Þ ð0:010Þ ð0:012Þ ð0:013Þ ð0:013Þ ð0:023Þ
Observations 361;336
Note: Estimates from a difference-in-difference linear probability model (LPM) corresponding to Eqn. (1). Estimates are interpreted as percentage points. Standard errors
clustered at the district level are reported in parentheses. The model includes a full set of year dummies, regional effects, and region by year interaction effects. Covariates
include, household size, distance to health facility, sex, age, and age squared of an individual, as well as household head characteristics such as occupational status, marital
status, and educational level.
⁄Significant at 10%; ⁄⁄Significant at 5%; ⁄⁄⁄Significant at 1%.
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with and without covariates.
A.4. Differential selection into reporting sickness or injury
Since utilization is driven by the likelihood of reporting sickness
or injury, and vice versa, there is a possibility of bias where the
probability of reporting sickness/injury changes differently
between treated and control areas. Table 13 shows that the propor-
tion of individuals reporting sickness in treated and control areas
did not change differently. However, the coefficient is significant
at the 10% level for the T2 group in 2010. Of course since this par-
ticular regression is conducted on the whole dataset (361,336
observations), finding a significant effect at 10% may not necessar-
ily imply bias. It may however also suggest that the removal of user
fees led to a slight increase in reporting sickness or injury which is
a form of moral hazard.
A.5. Falsification tests and compositional changes
There is still a possibility that other events affected treated and
control groups differently and hence generated a false ‘‘treatment
effect”. Although we see no other apparent reason or possible con-
current event that would significantly reduce the percentage of
individuals incurring positive spending while at the same time
drastically changing utilization, it is important to query this possi-
bility. One way of doing this is to conduct falsification tests were
we ask if the removal of user fees significantly affected covariates
that are expected to be unresponsive to the removal policy. To
achieve this, we fit a simple difference-in-difference models to all
our covariates.12
In particular, very significant changes in key covariates such as
employment status, distance to a health facility, education, espe-
cially in the post-treatment period, is evidence of other things hap-
pening other than removal of user fees. Tables 2 and 3, Columns 3–
6, in Section 3(b(ii)) show that almost all key covariates were not
affected differently in the T1u group compared to the control.
A.6. Randomization tests
High correlation in observations over time (serial correlation) or
within an areas (intra-cluster correlation) has a potential to under-
estimate standard errors. Since the user fee removal policy was
implemented at the district level one needs to cluster the standard
errors at the district level or aggregate the data in order to deal12 For example, to check for differential changes between T1 and control as reported
in Table 2, we estimate difference-in-difference models of the form:
Xcidt ¼ /0 þ /1yr1998þ /2yr2002þ /3yr2006þ /4yr2010þ /5T1d
þ /6ðT1d  yr1998Þ þ /7ðT1d  yr2002Þ þ /8ðT1d  yr2006Þ þ /9ðT1d  yr2010Þ þ ijt
where Xcidt is covariate c for individual i residing in district j at time t and T1d ¼ 1 if
district j was treated. We report p-values of the interaction effects /6;/7;/8, and /9
in Table 2 and Table 3 for T2.
Please cite this article in press as: Hangoma, P., et al. Does Free Public Health Car
Effects. World Development (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2017.0with the problem of within cluster correlation (Bertrand et al.,
2004). We clustered standard errors at the district level.
Serial correlation is also a possible threat to the validity of our
findings, and we have not addressed it yet. In a difference-in-
difference strategy, outcomes are mostly positively correlated over
time, and this is worsened by the fact that the treatment indicator
itself is highly serially correlated; because it is kept on-equal to
one-throughout the study period. This severely underestimates
the standard errors of conventional DD models. Using randomly
generated placebo interventions, Bertrand et al. (2004) found a false
rejection rate, at the 5% level, of up to 44% even after standard errors
are clustered at the group level or the data are aggregated to the
group level. Since these were placebo interventions, significant
effects (rejection rates) were expected in approximately 5% of the
simulations.
To assess the extent of this problem, we conducted randomiza-
tion experiments similar to those of Bertrand et al. (2004). This
involves the 54 districts (T1 group) and the urban areas of the 18
districts (control group). If serial correlation is not a problem, the
rejection rate in simulations where treatment is turned on in both
2006 and 2010 (call it the pooled model) should be close to the
rejection rate where treatment effect is only turned on in either
2010 or 2006.13 We found a 6.1% rejection rate in simulation of the
pooled model while the other model yielded a rejection rate of 7.1%,
suggesting that serial correlation is not a problem in our setup.References
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